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STATEMENT OF FACTS
There is and was no conflict on the facts involved
in this trial. The automobile accident involved three
cars proceeding north on Hickory Road, Hill Air Force
Base, a two lane road (T-10). It was daylight. The
driver of the first vehicle, a Mustang, was on active
duty with the U.S. Air Force reporting to Hill Air
Force Base (T-4). He had never been stationed at
Hill Field (T-4). He was driving north on said road
when he observed a sign which stated "NO CIVILIAN
VEHICLE BEYOND THIS POINT" {T-11). Seely
assumed that the sign referred to him and stopped
(T-11). His stop was in the lane of traffic {T-12),

although he could have driven off the side of the road.
He was stopped for several seconds prior to the time
of impact (T-15). He had stopped in a normal fashion
(T-7), not jumping on the brake or panicing (T-7).
The stop occurred approximately 10 yards past the sign
previously described. At the time, there were no cars
coming from the opposite direction (T-15 ).
The plaintiff, Hines, came up behind Seely. He
observed Seely's brake lights go on and he came to a
normal stop (T-67),not a sudden stop (T-67), approximately 10 feet to the rear of the Seely vehicle (T-67).
After coming to a stop, Hines put his foot on the
clutch, shifted into second gear, reached for a cigarette
at which time he was rammed from the rear by the
vehicle being driven by the defendant Harbertson ('l1-68).
The impact knocked him into the vehicle owned
by Seely, causing either $89 or $98 damage to the
Seely vehicle. The Hines vehicle was knocked 127 feet
from the point of impact (T-69). One side of the
frame was knocked forward 7 inches and the left to
a 45 degree angle. The damage to the vehicle was
$564 (T-74).
The defendant, Harbertson, whose impact caused
the damage complained of, was driving a 1968 Plymouth
that was damaged in the approximate amount of $600
(T-17). Ea0h wheel laid down 45 feet of skid marks
prior to the impact (T-20).
The road, at the point of impact, was a straight
road (T-22). When Harbertson was approximately 100
feet behind the Hines vehicle, he looked to the left
at a warehouse (T-23). \Vl1en he looked back, he was 50
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feet away and unable to stop (T-23). He stated that
had he not looked at the warehouse, he would have
been able to stop in time to avoid the collision (T-25
and {T-26). The defendant, Harbertson, who was an
employee of Hill Air Force Base, completely familiar
with the highway, described the road as follows:
"There is not a definite curve. There is a Y
about, Oh, a good block beyond the point of impact,
where one road goes this way and the other kind of
takes an off-shoot, not a real curve. There is very
little turn to the road" {T-28).
Harbertson never did see the Seely vehicle until
after the impact (T-24), although he knew he had to
expect traffic on that road (T-31).
The plaintiff, Hines, is 48 years old, married, with
four children (T-65 ). A normally right handed man,
he lost his r1ght arm in Belgium January 4, 1945 (T-66)".
He overcame said disability and worked his way to a
GS - 12 Equipment Specialist Ordinance Supervisor
{T-66), and taught himself to hunt, fish, and bowl left
handed with modifications to his equipment (T-67).
Since that accident, he has been unable to engage in
any of his normal recreational pursuits (T-76, 77, 78),
and has pain each day.
At the time of the accident, the plaintiff, Pearce
Hines, had some arthritis of the spine (T-38), but his
back had never bothered him (T-77). Dr. Gardner,
who had treated the plaintiff for a substantial period
of time and who had operated on him (T-43), testified
that Hines had been assymptomatic prior to the accident. That while Hines had obviously had the con-
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I
dition, he did not know he had it aud that there was
nothing in his prior treatnwnt of Pearce Hines to
indicate that he had ever had any difficulty or baek
problem prior to the time of the accident Cl 1 -44 and
T-45). The doctors examination, immediately prior
to trial, indicated the objective signs as limitation of
motion and muscle spasm tenderness ('11 -42), and that
he has a permanent impairment of his back (T-42 and
T-43) that will permanently prevent him from engaging
in most sport activities or heavy physical work and
which require movement of the body and particularly
movement of the spine (T-47). Dr. Gardner's testimony was uncontradicted.

ARGUMENT
POINT 1
THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING NO INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY ADVISING THEM OF THEIR
DUTIES, DEFINING LEGAL TERMINOLOGY, OR
FURNISHING GUIDE LINES FOR THEIR DELIBERATIONS.
The defendant Harbertson is appealing to this
Court because of the alleged failure of the Court to
give certain cautionary instructions. His exceptions are
set forth in full as follows:
"The defendant further excepts to the Court's
failure to give the jury cautionary instructions
with relation to their duties as jurors. The
fact that their verdict should not be based upon
sympathy, conjecture or speculation. '11 hat their
verdict should be confined solely to the evidence
produced in Court." (T-120)
4

The law in Utah relative to exceptions was Ill.id
down in Employers' Mut. Liability Ins. Co. of Wisconsin vs Allen Oil Co., 123 U 253, 258 P2d 445 as
follows:
"The appellants' objection in the trial court
to instruction No. 19 was couched in general
terms, viz 'on the grounds and for the reasons
that such instruction is not supported by, and is
contrary to, the law and the evidence. That it
is misleading, and can only serve to confuse the
jury.' rrhe objection failed to comply with the
requirements of Rule 51, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, that 'In objecting to the giving of
an instruction, a party must state distinctly the
matter to which he objects and the grounds of
his objection.' One of the purposes in requiring
counsel to make objections to instructions in
the trial court is to bring to the attention of the
court all claimed errors in the instructions and
to give him an opportunity to correct them if he
deems it proper. The objection should be specific enough to give the trial court notice of the
very error in the instruction which is complained
of on appeal. But an objection that an instruction is 'not supported by, and is contrary to, the
law' lacks specificness and does not direct the
court's attention to anything in particular."

It will be observed that he did not specifically object
to the failure to give JIFU Instruction No. 1.1, 1.5, 1.8,
or 1.13; nor did not request or submit any instructions
for the Courts approval.
5

Further, error cannot be based upon failure to give
a particular instruction when no request therefor is
made, STatc vs Lee Foo Lun, 45 U 531, 147 Pac 488; in
re Hanson's Will 50 U 207, 167 Pac 256; Salt Lake and
U. P. Union RR vs. Schram, 56 U53, 189 Pac. 90; Taylor
vs RR, 61 U 524, 216 Pac 239; State vs M cN a11ghton,
92 U 99, 58 P2d 5.
The duty of a court to give cautionary instruction
is not the same as is the duty to give instructions relative
to the issues on the case. The giving of cautionary instruction is within the sound discretion of a court,
Wilcox vs. Coons, Missouri, 241 SW2d 907; State vs.
Black, Oregon, 193, 295, 236 P2d 326; and there is authority to the effect that cautionary instructions should not
be given if the same is unnecessary, Missouri, Morris vs.
Dupont deNemours and Company, 351 Mo. 479, 173
SW2d 39; Iowa, Clark Vs. Hubbell, 249 I 306, 36 NW2d
905; Wimberley vs. City of Paterson, NJ 183, A2d 691;
Johnson vs. Nathan, 161 Neb. 399, 73 NW2d 398; Georgia
Bittler vs. Cane, 100 SE' 2d 598.
1

The refusal to give a cautionary instruction is in
error unless it appears that the discretionary power of
the court to give or refuse to give an instruction has
been abused, Beyer vs. Martin, 120 Iowa Appeals 50;
Arnold vs. RR Co., Mo., 154 SW2d 58; see also, Butler
vs. Cane, Georgia Supra.
It has been held that it is not improper to instruct a
jury that they are not to be influenced by sympathy or
prejudice providing the circumstances warrant, H oitgh vs.
Miller Idaho 44 NE2d 228 ,· Wedhemer vs. Cincinnati
'
'
State Railway Co., Ohio, 42 NE2d 460. However, in Mis-
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souri, Johnson vs. St. Louis RR Co., 173 Mo. 307, 73 SW2d 173 has held that it is improper to do so when nothing
has transpired to indicate that the jurors are not aware
of their duty. In a proper case, the Court should give
such an instruction when requested so to do, Shanks
vs. RR Co., 98 Wash. 509, 167 Pac. 1074.
The defendant Harbertson does not claim that there
was any evidence upon which the court should have been
required to give such an instruction. Nor, has he contended that the court abused his discretion.
His appeal is predicated upon the conception that
a court has the same obligation to instruct the jury for
cautionary rules as it does on the principle facts and
issues. He correctly states further the latter rule as
stated in 53 AM JUR Trial, Section 510. The rule is
again stated similarly in 53 AM JUR Trial, Section 512
as follows:

"It is a well-stated general principle that

the instructions given by the trial court should
be confined to the issues raised by the pleadings
in the case at bar and the facts developed by
the evidence in support of those issues or admitted at the bar. In other words, the particular
matters to be covered in the instructions depend
upon the issues joined by the pleading and supported by the evidence."
The Utah cases that he cites are in direct support
of this rule, Sutton vs. Otis Elevator Co., 68 U 85, 249
Pac. 437; Hanks vs. Christensen, 11 U2d 8, 354 P2d 564,
and Johnson vs. Cornwall Warehouse, 16 U2d 186, 398
P2d 24. The cases all can be viewed in light of the
7

courts statement jn Hanks vs. Christensen
"The criticism of the substance of the inrelates mainly to the charge that
they do not spell out the correct standard of
care."
None of these cases ref er even by inference to a
duty to give what the defendant Harberston himself
recognizes to be solely cautionary instructions.
The court having directed a verdict against the
defendant Harbertson correctly submitted the issue and
element of damage to the jury. The defendant Harbertson does not contend that the damage instruction so
given was incorrect so that the only issue for the jury
to consider was, in fact, instruction upon damages and
properly so.
The failure to give cautionary instructions rests
upon the sound discretion of the trial court. No abuse
of that discretion was alleged or proven.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DIRECTING
1
THE VERDICT AGAINST THE DEFENDAN1
HARBERTSON.
The plaintiff brought this action against Nile W.
Harbertson and Gil B. Seely charging that they were
guilty of joint and concurrent negligence. Both parties
answered charging contributory negligence.
At the conclusion of the evidence, the plaintiff made
a motion to find that the plaintiff was guilty of no
negligence or contributory negligence as a matter of law.
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(TR-111). The Court granted that motion (TR-115).
Neither party has raised any issue as to the correctness
of the motion or of the ruling thereon. As this matter
stands, the plaintiff was not and could not be found
guilty of negligence or contributory negligence.
The plaintiff further made a motion to find both
parties guilty of negligence as a matter of law and
further to find the issues of liability in favor of the
plaintiff and against the defendants and each of them
as a matter of law (TR-111).
The defendant Seely made a motion asking the
Court for a non-suit and to find the defendant not guilty
of negligence as a matter of law, or in the alternative,
that if said defendant Seely was guilty of negligence,
that is was not a proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries
(TR-112).
The Court granted the plaintiff's motion finding
the defendant Harbertson liable as a matter of law
(TR-115) and at the same time, granted the defendant
Seely's motion for non-suit. (TR-115 ).
The defendant Harbertson has taken exception to
the Courts ruling finding him liable as a matter of law,
and has raised this issue on appeal.
The testimony of the defendant Harbertson himself is conclusive on this point, and as a consequence,
is set out in detail as follows:

"Q. Is there any possibility that maybe you could
have turned out, and avoided these vehicles?
"A. I did partiall turn, but not very much.
"Q. Well, what do you estimate your speed to be
at the time of impact? When you hit .Mr. Hines?
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"A. If I had had ten more feet, I'd have been
stopped. So I think I was probably down to ten miles
an hour, or less.
"Q. Didn't it drive his vehicle ahead several
The impact1
"A. Well, he rolled.
"Q. You don't know how many feet he rolled 1
"A. No, sir, I don't. I don't know how many feet
he rolled.
"Q. Do you think, if you had been looking straight
down the highway, that you would have been able to
have got that other ten feet to have stopped¥
"MR. MIDGLEY: We'll object to that, as calling
for a conclusion.
"THE COURT: Oh, I'll sustain the objection to
the form of the question. You can rephrase it, if you
like, Mr. Murray.
"MR. MURRAY: Q. Mr. Harbertson, do you have
an opinion-You said first of all ten feet more and
you would have been stopped¥
"A. y es, sir.
.
"Q. And would this time you were looking at the
warehouse, had you been looking straight ahead, do
you have an opinion as to whether this would have given
you enough time to make up for that ten feet 1
"A. I think I would have stopped, if I had realized they were slowing down, quicker.
"Q. If you had been looking straight ahead¥
"A. Right." (TR-24, 25, 26).
It will be seen that the defendant Harbertson admitted that had he been looking at the road, he would
have seen the vehicle and could and would have stopped
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in time to a void the impact.
Dr. William James Gardner, the only physician to
testify, gave his opinion that the impact was responsible for the results that the plaintiff Hines has and
the disability which he has now and will have in the
future (TR-43).
There was no conflict in the evidence. There were
no other witnes8es that in any way cast any doubt upon
the defendant Harbertson himself, and no evidence upon
which anyone could reasonably conclude that said defendant Harbertson was not negligent and that such
negligence was a proximate cause.
The defendant Harbertson has not contended on
appeal, nor did he do so during the trial, that the plaintiff Hines was in any way negligent, nor does he raise
the issue of the correctness of the trial courts ruling
this appeal. It is submitted that he has waived any
right to contend that the plaintiff Hines was in any
way negligent.
It does not avail the defendant Harbertson to
raise the issue as to the purported negligence of the defendant Seely.

The rule is well stated in 52 AM JUR Torts, Sec.
tion 110:
"A person who joins in committing a tort
cannot escape liability by showing that another
person is liable also; that a third person cooperated in the wrong is no justification for
the misconduct of the defendant. The general
rule as to this matter is that joint tort-feasors
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are jointly and severally liable. Hence, a tort
jointly committed by several may be treated as
joint or several at the election of the aggrieved
party."
Neither is the defendant Harbertson able to claim
that the rule heretofore stated is applicable because of
some right of contribution. The rule relative thereto
is stated further in 18.AJ2d Page 44 as follows:
"The general doctrine that one of several
•persons equally situated who has been compelled to bear more than his equitable share of
a common burden is entitled to contribution
from the others who have borne less than their
respective shares has been subjected to a general
qualification in cases where the common burden is a joint liability of such persons as tortf easors or wrongdoers. In the absence of a
statute in the particular jurisdiction governing
the right, it has been frequently declared judicially that as among or between joint wrongdoers or tort-feasors there can be no contribution, and that one of several persons who become
liable to another for a wrong cannot enforce
contribuition from his co-wrongdoers although
he is compelled to discharge the whole or more
than his share of such liability."
The above rules have been adopted by the Supreme
Court of the State of Utah in Hardman vs. Matthews,
1 U2d 110 262, P2d 748. In the above case, the plaintiff sued defendants for injuries arising our of an automobile collision. The defendant sued to interplead the
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driver and owner of the car in which plaintiff was
driving. Claiming with that, the driver as a sole cause
of the injury or at least a contributory cause, and that
they were entitled to contribution from joint or concurring tort-feasors. The Court, speaking through Justice
Henroid said,
"If the negligence of the interpleaded parties
were the sole proximate cause of the injuries
as defendants maintain, the latter would have
a complete defense to the action without the
joinder. If actively they were jointly or concurrently negligent with defendants, joinder
would avail the latter noting since contribution
cannot be had between joint or concurring tortf easors, in a case like this, unless sanctioned by
statute, there being none such in Utah."

The defendant Harbertson had no right either to
cause the defendant Seely to be joined or for contribution therefrom.
The defendant Harbertson's contentions upon Point
II are without foundation or merit.
POINT III
THE DAMAGES FOUND WERE EXCESSIVE.
Dr. William James Gardner, Jr. testified at the
trial as follows: (TR-61)
"Well, primarily his difficulty (Hines) is
confined to his back. His low back, and the
lumbar area. Where he has spasm, limiation of
motion and tenderness. These are all objective
findings. Then he has subjective complaints
of pain.
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"Well, I presume that it's a combination of
muscular and ligamentous injuries that occurred at the time of the accident, superimposed
upon a pre-existing condition of osteoarthritis.
"That he was assymptomatic as regard to
any pre-existing physical condition prior to the
time of the accident (TR-43) and that on the basis;
of the history, the repeated physical examination that he had performed that the man (Hines)
has a permanent impairment of his back."
The Court instructed the jury in part as follows :
"Where the result of an accident is to bring
into activity a dormant disease or one to which
the injured person is predisposed, the person
so causing such activity is liable for the entire
damages which ensue as a proximate result of
the accident."
The defendant Harbertson made no exception or
objection to said instruction and it is respectfully submitted that the above instruction is a correct statement of law. The rule is set forth in 22AM JU R 2d
Damage Section 123, Page 175 as follows:
"The general rule is that where the result
of the accident is to bring into activity a dormant
or incipient disease, or one to which the injured
person is predisposed, the defendant is liable for
the entire damages which ensue, for it cannot be
said that the development of the disease as a
result of the injury was not the consequence
which might naturally or ordinarily follow as
a result of the mJury, and therefore, the negli-
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gent person may be held liable therefor. If a
latent condition itself does not cause pain, suffering, etc., but that condition plus an injury
caused such pain, the injury, and not the latent
condition, is the proximate cause of the pain."
See also, 111 ayer vs. Merrick, Colorado, 155 Col. 73,
392 P2d 653; 111 orrison vs. Hanson, Conn., 20 A2d 624;
Locku.:ood vs. McCaskill, NC, 138 SE2d 541; Meeks vs.
Yancey, Tenn. 311 SW2d 329; Gowdey vs. U. S., Michigan, 271 Fed. Supp. 733; N ownes vs. Hillside Lounge,
Inc., 179 Neb. 157, 137 NW2d 361.
Based upon that evidence, the instructions and the
further statement of the doctor to the effect that:
"Hines could at all times in the future expect that sports activity or heavy physical work
which require movements of the body, and particularly of the spine.
"These movements tend to bring the muscles,
ligaments and joints into play, and, when these
joints have disease in them, the muscles about'
the joints try to splint the spine, so that it doesn't
move as much, because that causes pain." TR-47
It is submitted that when one considers that the
accident occurred on March 27, 1968 and the symptoms
as found by the doctor were still present on May 1,
1969 and were permanent; and when one further considers that at the time of the accident that the plaintiff
was a 47 year old man, it is repectfully submitted that
the jury verdict of $9,000 was modest, and that the remittur of $1,000 ordered by the court was indeed unnecessary and incorrect.
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